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Challenges and Opportunities Facing Religious
Freedom in the Public Square
Judge J. Clifford Wallace ∗
In this opening address, I highlight several reasons why I feel our
conference topic—the challenges and opportunities facing the free
exercise of religion in the public sphere—merits our enthusiasm and
careful consideration. I begin by pointing out some of the many
ways in which religious freedom can invigorate and reinforce
democratic government. I then propose a simple metaphor—the
public square—that may be useful in evaluating how well various
nations have nurtured the freedom of religion. By framing the
inquiry in terms of the public square, we can also identify some of
the challenges to free exercise both in this nation and abroad. I
briefly examine the views of the Founders of the United States
Constitution and then consider two of the obstacles faced in other
countries in ensuring that diverse individuals can choose, embrace,
or altogether reject different religions in the public square.
I. THE SECULAR VALUE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
As I see it, religious freedom and democracy go hand in hand;
each strengthens and reinforces the other in several ways. First, many
believe the free exercise of religion can promote a more humanitarian
and tolerant society. For example, most religions teach the
importance of a power greater than one’s self. The very nature of this
belief puts an adherent in a position where he or she believes that the
beginning and end of all creation, and the importance of life,
transcend individual needs and wants.1 As one comes to understand
∗ Senior Judge and former Chief Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit. The views expressed in this article are entirely the author’s. He does not attempt to
reflect the views of the other members of his court. He is indebted to K. Cain for her valuable
assistance with this article.
1. See Frederick Mark Gedicks & Roger Hendrix, Democracy, Autonomy, and Values:
Some Thoughts on Religion and Law in Modern America, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 1579, 1588
(1987) (“The religious link between the mundane here and now of physical existence and the
possibility of a transcendent, enduring reality beyond, instills in many religious people the
desire and duty to improve their own lot and that of their fellows by suggesting the moral
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that others are equally subordinated, there exists a greater likelihood
of involvement with other members of society. One becomes more
attuned to the horizontal equality that knits a community together,
as well as the vertical belief in a higher power, which instills a sense
of humility. A greater horizontal and vertical sense of society creates
a “turning out,” or a turning away from self toward society. This
“turning out” phenomenon increases the possibility of genuine
concern for others and is important to a society that cares for those
in need.2
Second, most religions promote civic virtue and influence
believers to be law abiding.3 Democratic societies generally function
because the vast majority of people are willing to obey the law
without enforcement action by the state.4 Even if possible, it does
not make sense to allocate limited government resources to a police
force capable of enforcing all laws in a non-law abiding society.
Allowing people to exercise religious beliefs that tend to encourage
acceptance of legal norms can therefore further a law-abiding
culture, which is essential to democracy.5
Third, religious freedom preserves an important opportunity for
choice, which is a key component of liberty. When each religious
community is free to proclaim its tenets and teach others, there will
possibilities of a better way of living, and by cultivating respect for law, including a greater
willingness to restrict one’s own choices and actions to benefit others. Thus, religious
consciousness is an important positive influence on the substance of societal values.”).
2. In addition to the individual “turning out” effect, religious institutions also display
a “turning out” by providing various humanitarian services. See, e.g., Walz v. Tax Comm’n,
397 U.S. 664, 687 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring) (observing that religious organizations
“contribute to the well-being of the community in a variety of nonreligious ways, and thereby
bear burdens that would otherwise either have to be met by general taxation, or be left
undone, to the detriment of the community”).
3. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 222 (1972) (“[T]his record strongly
shows that the Amish community has been a highly successful social unit within our society,
even if apart from the conventional ‘mainstream.’ Its members are productive and very
law-abiding members of society . . . .”).
4. President John Adams remarked, “[W]e have no government armed with power
capable of contending with human passions unbridled by morality and religion . . . .” DAVID
BARTON, ORIGINAL INTENT 319 & n.2 (3d ed. 2000). See also Gedicks & Hendrix, supra
note 1, at 1595 (“Because even a relatively small number of dissenters can render law
enforcement ineffective, an overwhelming majority of persons must be willing voluntarily to
restrict their personal choices and actions to those not prohibited by law if law is to have
significant force and effect.”).
5. In the words of Benjamin Franklin, “[O]nly a virtuous people are capable of
freedom. As nations become corrupt and vicious, they have more need of masters.” BARTON,
supra note 4, at 321 & n.13.
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be a wider landscape of varying religious views and a broader
spectrum of choices. As a result, each individual has a greater
opportunity to make a choice that best fits his or her personal needs.
Religious freedom is therefore both an important end in itself as well
as one of the cornerstones of self-determination, individual choice
and pluralism.6 There is a profound liberty interest in being able to
choose something as fundamental and personal as religion.7 Thus,
with freedom to thrive, religions can help elevate the political process
in society to a higher plane of democracy and individual freedom.8
Freedom to choose a religion that best fits individual needs will also
result in a more stable, satisfied society.9
Finally, just as our collective viewpoint is enriched by ethnic and
racial diversity, so too can diversity in religious cultures contribute to

6. See Michael E. Smith, The Special Place of Religion in the Constitution, 1983 SUP.
CT. REV. 83, 107–13 (1983), for a discussion of personal freedom as a justification for the
special constitutional treatment of religion. See also Kokkinakis v. Greece, 260 Eur. Ct. H.R.
(ser. A) at 1 (1993), available at http://www.echr.coe.int/Eng/Judgments.htm. The
Kokkinakis court explained the relationship between freedom of religion and democracy as
follows:
[F]reedom of thought, conscience and religion is one of the foundations
of a “democratic society” within the meaning of the Convention [for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms]. It is, in its
religious dimension, one of the most vital elements that go to make up
the identity of believers and their conception of life, but it is also a
precious asset for atheists, agnostics, sceptics and the unconcerned. The
pluralism indissociable from a democratic society, which has been dearly
won over the centuries, depends on it.
Id. at 17.
7. See, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 461 (1961) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring) (“By its nature, religion—in the comprehensive sense in which the Constitution
uses that word—is an aspect of human thought and action which profoundly relates the life of
man to the world in which he lives.”); Gedicks & Hendrix, supra note 1, at 1602.
8. “Respect for the exercise of conscience and religion is a fundamental aspect of a
universal understanding of human rights.” Orrin G. Hatch, Religious Liberty at Home and
Abroad: Reflections on Protecting this Fundamental Freedom, 2001 BYU L. REV. 413, 413–14.
9. See, e.g., JOHN LOCKE, A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION 19–21 (Encyclopedia
Britannica, Inc. 2d ed. 1990) (1689) (recognizing that the legitimacy and stability of a political
regime can be enhanced by tolerating a range of religious outlooks); cf. THOMAS I. EMERSON,
THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 6–9 (1970) (positing that in a democratic society,
the system of freedom of expression is based on, inter alia, the principle that freedom of
expression is essential as a means of assuring individual self-fulfillment and is a method of
achieving a more adaptable, stable community).
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our political and social discourse.10 It is important to consider diverse
perspectives in dealing with new challenges facing our society.
II. FREEDOM IN THE PUBLIC SQUARE—A METAPHOR FOR
EVALUATING RELIGIOUS LIBERTY
With this background, we can turn to assessing how well various
nations have been strengthening and protecting diverse religious
cultures. One measure of a country’s success is how well it treats all
religions and how freely its people are able to openly practice their
beliefs. In this regard, our focus can be more precise: while the topic
of our conference is religion in the public sphere, I propose we
examine the extent to which a country has nurtured the free exercise
of religion by focusing on whether it has promoted religious freedom
in the public square.
In earlier days, and to some extent still, communities had a block
of land in the center of the city where open communication and
debate would occur. Hyde Park Corner in London, England, is a
good example of such a public square.11 The communication and
debate that took place in these forums is vital to the free exercise of

10. See, e.g., Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 689 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring)
(“[R]eligious organizations . . . uniquely contribute to the pluralism of American society by
their religious activities. . . . [E]ach group contributes to the diversity of association, viewpoint,
and enterprise essential to a vigorous, pluralistic society.”); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319
U.S. 141, 150 (1943) (Murphy, J., concurring) (“[U]nity and strength are best accomplished,
not by enforced orthodoxy of views, but by diversity of opinion through the fullest possible
measure of freedom of conscience and thought.”); Kenneth L. Karst, Paths to Belonging: The
Constitution and Cultural Identity, 64 N.C. L. REV. 303 (1986). Karst explained:
Today’s constitutional doctrines of equal citizenship, freedom of religion,
and freedom of expression mediate cultural conflict by opening our public
life to the participation of cultural minorities. By defending against
cultural subordination and the coercion of cultural conformity, the same
doctrines also promote tolerance for cultural difference. Together, these
guarantees promise individuals broad freedom to choose for themselves
among “the varieties of ethnic experience.”
Id. at 336.
11. See Dan Hunter, Cyberspace as Place and the Tragedy of the Digital Anticommons, 91
CAL. L. REV. 439, 488 (2003). Hunter noted the following about public squares:
The ideal of the public forum suggests a place where citizens can
congregate, air their grievances, debate public policy, and be confronted
with new thoughts and arguments. Archetypal public forums include the
Athenian Senate and Hyde Park’s Speaker’s Corner, and the myth of their
influence and importance is hard to dispel.
Id.
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religion. If we visited the town squares of various communities,
would we find religions free to advance their causes openly without
fear of government interference? Does freedom of religion grow and
develop in the town square unmolested by dominant religions?
These broad “public square” questions may help us focus on
particular restrictions on religion and then critically evaluate these
restrictions in order to determine whether they are justifiable.12
Clearly, a sensible approach to promoting religious freedom must be
principled, pragmatic, and flexible, while maintaining a keen eye
toward ferreting out pretextual restrictions that are designed to
suppress unpopular religious beliefs.
Perhaps some specific questions will further refine the public
square examination:
1. Can all churches proffer their religious beliefs?
2. Are all religions treated equally by the state?
3. Can religious groups teach others their beliefs openly and
encourage acceptance?
4. Are there government restrictions on open and free
religious dialogue?
5. Are there restrictions on the distribution of written
materials used to explain one’s religious views, or can
12. Consider, for example, the analysis of the European Court of Human Rights in Serif
v. Greece, 9 Eur. Ct. H.R. 73 (1999), available at http://www.echr.coe.int/Eng/
Judgments.htm. In that case, Serif claimed his conviction for “usurping the functions of a
minister of a ‘known religion’ and publicly wearing the uniform of such a minister amounted
to a violation of his rights” under Article 9 of the Convention for the Protection of
Fundamental Rights and Freedoms. Id. at 77. Article 9 provides:
Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such
limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic
society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order,
health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of
others.
Id. at 84. The court reasoned that while
[i]t is true that in a democratic society it may be necessary to place
restrictions on freedom of religion to reconcile the interests of the various
religious groups . . . any such restriction must correspond to a “pressing
social need” and must be “proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.”
Id. at 87 (internal citations omitted). After weighing the competing interests at stake in the
case, the court concluded that Serif’s Article 9 rights had been violated. Id. at 89.
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religious institutions and their adherents freely distribute
such materials?
6. Are there visa restrictions placed on visitors entering the
country who wish to teach religion?
After identifying restrictions on religion, we should ask whether
those restrictions are arguably justified by balancing the importance
of free exercise against other societal goals. For example:
1. Does a religion adopt terrorism as a tenet or practice of
its sect, or does it advocate violation of generally
accepted criminal laws?
2. Does a religion teach concepts that are in violation of
basic human rights?
3. Is a restriction on religion necessary to ensure that others
can freely exercise their religious beliefs?
4. Are the religious restrictions aimed at silencing unwanted
religious views?
By focusing on specific facets of free exercise in the public
square, we can develop a general sense of where various nations have
drawn the line between establishing a national religion, tolerating all
religions equally, and, at the other end of the spectrum, wiping
religion out of the public square. Let us consider some examples.
III. A BRIEF EXAMINATION OF ILLUSTRATIVE PUBLIC SQUARES
The challenges to religious freedom will vary among countries
and regions based on differences in culture, history, structure of
government, and myriad other factors. Applying the public square
metaphor to varying nations, we can evaluate how well they have
encouraged and established freedom of religion. The experience of
the United States provides one of many possible starting points,
which I briefly discuss here only for comparative purposes.
A. United States: Non-Discriminatory Encouragement of Religion
The success of the United States Constitution as an authoritative
document of governance can be observed by the fact that it has now
existed for more than two hundred years—the longest life of any
602
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written constitution in the history of the world.13 Examining the
views of the Founders of the Constitution can shed light on why
even today we feel religious freedom is so integral to the social and
political fabric of our nation as well as inform us about the challenges
to religious freedom that have nonetheless been a part of this
nation’s history.
The Founders sought to protect the important societal and
individual values of free religion in part by means of the
Establishment Clause: “Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion.”14 As I have explained elsewhere, the
Founders’ primary concern was to prevent the establishment of a
dominant religion—the power of which would squelch the voice of
smaller religions.15 They did not create an impenetrable wall to
prevent any relations between government and religion. Nowhere in
the Constitution are the words “wall of separation”16 to be found.17
However, subsequent misinterpreters of the Constitution and its
Founders have embraced the now-proverbial “separation of church
and state,”18 with some advocating a government that is indifferent
to the role of religion in our society.
History seems to support the argument that the Establishment
Clause was not meant to be interpreted as anti-religious, but only as

13. See, e.g., David A.J. Richards, Constitutional Legitimacy and Constitutional Privacy,
61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 800, 811 (1986).
14. U.S. CONST. amend. I. This prohibition has been enforced against the states by
incorporation of the First Amendment into the due process guarantee of the Fourteenth
Amendment. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940) (“The First Amendment
declares that Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof. The Fourteenth Amendment has rendered the legislatures of the
states as incompetent as Congress to enact such laws.”).
15. J. Clifford Wallace, The Framers’ Establishment Clause: How High the Wall?, 2001
BYU L. REV. 755, 769.
16. PHILIP HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 161 (2002). See infra
note 21 and accompanying text for the historical context of the phrase.
17. HAMBURGER, supra note 16, at 756 & n.16 (“[N]one of the twenty drafts of the
religion clauses generated by the state ratification process and the First Congress contained this
or similar phrases.”).
18. See, e.g., Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947) (“The First Amendment
has erected a wall between church and state. That wall must be kept high and impregnable. We
could not approve the slightest breach.”); Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 686
(2002) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Whenever we remove a brick from the wall that was designed
to separate religion and government, we increase the risk of religious strife and weaken the
foundation of our democracy.”).
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a prohibition on preferential treatment for a particular church.19 I
believe the Chief Justice of the United States had the better of the
argument on this issue when he wrote the following in his dissent in
an Establishment Clause case:
The evil to be aimed at, so far as those who spoke [during the First
Congress’ debates on the First Amendment] were concerned,
appears to have been the establishment of a national church, and
perhaps the preference of one religious sect over another; but it was
definitely not concerned about whether the Government might aid
all religions evenhandedly.20

It is true that in a letter to a small religious group, Thomas
Jefferson, in the later years of his life, did state that the
Establishment Clause erected “a wall of separation between church
and state.”21 But as I have argued elsewhere, there can be no
“legislative history” from this statement as Mr. Jefferson was out of
the country at the time the amendments were debated and
adopted.22 Indeed, his earlier history demonstrates, and his actions
verify, that he did not embrace a governmental position of antireligion; rather, he merely conditioned government assistance on
equal access by all sects.23
Thus, the Establishment Clause was not meant to be antireligious. It was adopted only to be sure that no national religion

19. See, e.g., HAMBURGER, supra note 16, at 13–14. Hamburger states that
the First Amendment has often been understood to limit religious
freedom in ways never imagined by the late eighteenth-century dissenters
who demanded constitutional guarantees of religious liberty. . . . Not
least, the dissenters sought the First Amendment and other constitutional
provisions to prevent government from discriminating on account of
religious differences.
Id.; see also Wallace, supra note 15, at 756.
20. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 99 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
21. HAMBURGER, supra note 16, at 161; see also id. at 155–62 for a discussion of the
historical context of Jefferson’s letter to the Danbury Baptist Association.
22. Wallace, supra note 15, at 767–68.
23. See id. at 768; see also HAMBURGER, supra note 16, at 181:
After writing to the Danbury Baptist Association in 1802, Jefferson
himself apparently did not again directly advocate separation. He
continued to denounce the union of church and state, but he seems not
to have expressly urged separation. For example, when . . . he denounced
political preaching in 1815, he did not do so in terms of the separation of
church and state.
Id.
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was established and that no preferential treatment would be given to
a particular church, thereby assuring all religions a voice in the public
square. At its inception, there was no “wall of separation” but rather
a principle of encouragement of religions without discrimination—
under the First Amendment, Congress was enjoined from
“prohibiting the free exercise” of religion. With no nationally
recognized religion and a prohibition on governmental interference
with and discrimination against different religious practices, freedom
of religion in the public square would have the fertile ground it
needs to thrive.
My point today is not to reassess the debate between proponents
of these differing constitutional interpretations. Rather, I highlight
this dilemma because it illustrates one of the challenges faced by all
societies—namely, the difficulty of drawing a sensible line between
establishing religion and wiping it out of the public square
altogether. I suggest the Framers embraced a position between these
two points: non-discriminatory encouragement of all religions.
Reasonable minds can certainly differ on precisely where the line
should be drawn in particular cases, and much of the debate about
the role of religion vis-à-vis government boils down to this
fundamental question.
B. Challenges Abroad
Further applying this public square inquiry, we can now turn to
identifying and evaluating some of the challenges to free exercise
abroad. By way of example, I call to your attention two specific
obstacles: the view that religious pluralism must be suppressed in
order to promote a more stable society, and the stifling influence of a
dominant religion. Two cases decided by the European Court of
Human Rights are illustrative, and I discuss each in turn.
First, Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia v. Moldova illustrates the
view held by some that religious pluralism disrupts stable societies.
In this case, the European Court of Human Rights considered
whether the Moldovan authorities’ refusal to recognize the
Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia unlawfully infringed on freedom
of religion and association in violation of Article 9 of the Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
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(“Convention”).24 Pursuant to the Religious Denominations Act,
only religions recognized by the government could be practiced.25
The government contended, among other things, that because
the Republic of Moldova had been recognized as an independent
state only since 1991, it “had few strengths it could depend on to
ensure its continued existence, but one factor conducive to stability
was religion, the majority of the population being Orthodox
Christians.”26 Therefore, the government argued, if the Metropolitan
Church of Bessarabia was officially recognized, the “tie was likely to
be lost and the Orthodox Christian population dispersed among a
number of Churches.”27
The court recognized that protection of public order was a
legitimate aim, but it nonetheless held that
the refusal to recognise the applicant Church has such
consequences for the applicants’ freedom of religion that it cannot
be regarded as proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued or,
accordingly, as necessary in a democratic society, and that there has
been a violation of Article 9 of the Convention.28

The court also stated that “the role of the authorities . . . is not to
remove the cause of tension by eliminating pluralism, but to ensure
that the competing groups tolerate each other.”29
Thus, as this case demonstrates, one challenge facing religious
freedom in the public square is the belief that religious pluralism will
lead to societal instability. Proponents of this view contend that if
there are fewer choices—or perhaps only one choice—there will be
fewer or no differences in religious views, thus resulting in a more
stable society.30 But put in context, such instability is an unavoidable
24. Metro. Church of Bessarabia v. Moldova, 12 Eur. Ct. H.R. 39, 107 (2002),
available at http://www.echr.coe.int/Eng/Judgments.htm.
25. Id. at 110. In addition to being unable to practice their religion, unrecognized
churches could not defend their rights in the courts. As a result, members of the Metropolitan
Church of Bessarabia were unable to defend themselves against physical attacks and
persecution, and the Church could not protect its assets. Id. at 116.
26. Id. at 111.
27. Id. at 112.
28. Id. at 119.
29. Id. at 113.
30. See also Serif v. Greece, 9 Eur. Ct. H.R. 73 (1999), available at
http://www.echr.coe.int/Eng/Judgments.htm. In Serif, the Greek government contended
that “the authorities had to intervene in order to avoid the creation of tension among the
Muslims in Rodopi and between the Muslims and the Christians of the area as well as Greece
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aspect of democracy. Democratic elections cause instability. Even
when a political leader is democratically elected, various voices
strongly advocate their positions, and there are ordinarily adherents
in more than one political camp. This instability and pluralism is a
basic value within a democratic society;31 it is the liberty interest of
choice that is the basis of democracy.32 Accordingly, it is important
to ask why religious differences should be singled out for
discrimination.33 With so much natural and expected instability in a
democratic society, how can special restrictions on religion be
justified?
Yet another obstacle to religious freedom—the stifling influence
of a dominant religion—was at issue in Kokkinakis v. Greece.34 Article
13 of the Constitution of Greece provides: “There shall be freedom
to practise any known religion; individuals shall be free to perform
their rites of worship without hindrance and under the protection of
the law. The performance of rites of worship must not prejudice
and Turkey.” Id. at 88. See also Buscarini v. San Marino, 1 Eur. Ct. H.R. 605, (1999). In
Buscarini, members of Parliament were required to take an oath on the Holy Gospels, and the
government attempted to justify this requirement by arguing the oath was needed to “preserve
public order, in the form of social cohesion and the citizens’ trust in their traditional
institutions.” Id. at 616–17.
31. As one commentator has remarked, rather than assuming that instability is
undesirable, “[w]e should instead be fostering dissent, and we should be recognizing that
religious dissent has much to contribute to the creation of a more progressive society.” Steven
Shiffrin, Propter Honoris Respectum: Religion and Democracy, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1631,
1634 (1999) (citation omitted). Madison stated that
[i]n a free government the security for civil rights must be the same as
that for religious rights. It consists in the one case in the multiplicity of
interests and in the other in the multiplicity of sects. The degree of
security in both cases will depend on the number of interests and sects.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 270–71 (James Madison) (George W. Carey & James McClellan
eds., 2001); see also LOCKE, supra note 9, at 20 (“It is not the diversity of opinions (which
cannot be avoided), but the refusal of toleration to those that are of different opinions (which
might have been granted), that has produced all the bustles and wars that have been in the
Christian world upon account of religion.”).
32. See J. Clifford Wallace, The Jurisprudence of Judicial Restraint: A Return to the
Moorings, 50 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 5 (1981) (“[T]he same respect for human autonomy that
underlies liberty underlies democracy as well and establishes its intrinsic value.”).
33. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 6, at 97 (suggesting that many of the most divisive social
issues in the United States have not involved religion, such as “the completion of industrial
unionization in the late 1930s; McCarthyism in the early 1950s; the campaign for racial
equality from the middle 1950s onward; prolongation of the Vietnam War; and perhaps the
Watergate scandal”).
34. 260 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 1 (1993), available at http://www.echr.coe.int/
Eng/Judgments.htm.
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public order or public morals. Proselytism is prohibited.”35
Interestingly, the European Court of Human Rights observed that
the ban on proselytism was originally enacted after the Orthodox
Church, “which had long complained of a Bible society’s
propaganda directed at young Orthodox schoolchildren on behalf of
the Evangelical Church, managed to get a clause added to the first
Constitution (1844) forbidding ‘proselytism and any other action
against the dominant religion.’”36 This ban was eventually codified as
a criminal offense.37
Kokkinakis was a Jehovah’s Witness who visited the home of a
woman—whose husband was a cantor at a local Orthodox church—
and engaged with her in a discussion about religion. He was
convicted of proselytism after a criminal court determined that
Kokkinakis had
attempted to proselytize and, directly or indirectly, to intrude on
the religious beliefs of Orthodox Christians, with the intention of
undermining those beliefs, by taking advantage of their
inexperience, their low intellect, and their naïvety. In particular,
[he] went to the home of [Mrs. Kyriakaki] . . . and told her that
they brought good news; by insisting in a pressing manner, they
gained admittance to the house and began to read from a book on
the Scriptures which they interpreted with reference to a king of
heaven, to events which had not yet occurred but would occur,
etc., encouraging her by means of their judicious, skilful [sic]
explanations . . . to change her Orthodox Christian beliefs.38

In considering whether Kokkinakis’ conviction violated Article 9
of the Convention, the European Court of Human Rights
distinguished between “bearing Christian witness and improper
proselytism.”39 Whereas “the former corresponds to true evangelism,
which a report . . . describes as an essential mission and a
responsibility of every Christian and every Church,” improper
proselytism entails, for example, “exerting improper pressure on

35. Id. at 11.
36. Id. at 12.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 8–9 (omissions in original). The criminal court sentenced Kokkinakis to four
months in prison, which was convertible into a pecuniary penalty, as well as a fine of 10,000
drachmas. The court also ordered the confiscation and destruction of four booklets that
Kokkinakis had been hoping to sell. Id.
39. Id. at 21.
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people in distress or in need,” “offering material or social
advantages” to gain new members, or even “the use of violence or
brainwashing.”40 The court concluded the Greek courts had failed to
specify how Kokkinakis’ proselytizing was improper, and therefore
held that his conviction violated Article 9.41
This case illustrates how governments may be influenced by a
dominant church to impose restrictions on minority religions.42 The
motivation of a dominant church is not benign; it wishes to eliminate
competition. When a church achieves monopoly power, it is in a
position to restrict and, in some cases, to eliminate less powerful
religious organizations, thereby hindering the free practice of
religion in the public square.
Similar problems of monopoly arise in the context of capitalism
and market control. While it is true that economic monopolies can
provide certain services and have some advantages, experience has
demonstrated that the free enterprise system is far more valuable in
providing the best climate for economic growth, consumer
satisfaction, and individual prosperity. There are present examples of
countries that have made the dynamic swing from central
organization (government monopoly) to the free enterprise system,
with resulting benefits and economic progression for its citizens.43
Likewise, when a religious monopoly has the strength to squelch
other religious views, it diminishes or eliminates the growth
opportunities for religions generally. Just as some regulation is
necessary to ensure the smooth operation of markets, so it may be
necessary for the government to enforce a few basic rules in order to
keep the public square in good repair and the marketplace of
religious ideas vibrant. However, when a dominant religion
monopolizes the public square, the opportunity for individual
choice, the cross-fertilization of ideas, and other benefits of a
40. Id.
41. Id. at 21–22.
42. See id. at 11 (explaining that under Article 3 of the Constitution of Greece “[t]he
dominant religion in Greece is that of the Christian Eastern Orthodox Church”); see also
Manoussakis v. Greece, 4 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1346 (1997) (describing events in which the Greek
Orthodox Church made a complaint about the use of a room by Jehovah’s Witnesses, and a
prosecution was instituted for establishing and operating a place of religious worship without
authorization from the proper authorities), available at http://www.echr.coe.int/Eng/
Judgments.htm.
43. See John White, Privatization in Eastern and Central Europe, 13 INT’L L.
PRACTICUM 19 (Spring 2000).
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religiously diverse democracy are jeopardized. Thus, just as economic
monopolies can ultimately undermine capitalism, so too can religious
monopolies weaken democracy.
The influence of a dominant religion and government concerns
about stability are but two of the many obstacles to religious
freedom today. Other examples include the following: government
refusal to recognize certain religions, restrictions on the availability
of visas for religious missionaries, unnecessary restrictions on
building houses of worship, governmental designation of a religion
as a “sect” and imposing special restrictions on “sects,” and
discrimination against religions with headquarters in a different
country. Any one of these obstacles serves to hinder the development
of a true public square of religious freedom.
IV. CONCLUSION
The societal and individual value of the free exercise of religion
in the public square is vital to our continuing effort to provide the
best in the democratic institution. It is a topic that deserves our
individual and joint attention. At this conference, we will identify
and examine obstacles to religious freedom, with the goal of
developing a strategy for change. In undertaking this project, we
must take advantage of the opportunity to learn from the individual
experiences and perspectives that we each bring to the discussion. I
now turn the challenge over to you for your participation in this
exciting conference: “Religion in the Public Sphere: Challenges and
Opportunities.”
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